In this paper, we propose a hierarchical game approach to model the energy efficiency maximization problem where transmitters individually choose their channel assignment and power control. We conduct a thorough analysis of the existence, uniqueness and characterization of the Stackelberg equilibrium.
I. INTRODUCTION
Ecological concerns are steadily attracting more and more attention in wireless communications [1] , [2] . From the operators' perspective, energy efficiency not only has great ecological benefits and represents social responsibility in fighting climate change, but also has significant economic benefits. Therefore, innovative solutions that support traffic increase and maintain a limited energy consumption need to be considered at both system and device levels in order to address environmental and operational costs. Recently, Cisco systems have pointed out that the global mobile data traffic will increase nearly tenfold between 2014 and 2019, giving incentive for service providers to reduce their OpEx by reducing their energy consumption [3] . This suggests to shift from pursuing optimal capacity and spectral efficiency to efficient energy usage when designing wireless networks.
Indeed, spectral efficiency has been a traditional requirement of wireless architectures, especially when their access is limited to scarce spectrum. As a result, recent trends in mobile client access tend to support both spectral and energy efficiency at the same time while addressing a wide variety of delay and throughput objectives [4] .
CONTRIBUTIONS
To address these crucial issues among others, we propose to study energy efficient wireless networks in which we introduce a degree of hierarchy among users. More specifically, we consider energy efficient multi-carrier wireless networks that can be modeled by a decentralized multiple access channel. The network is said to be decentralized in the sense that each user can freely choose his power control policy and carrier assignment in order to selfishly maximize a certain individual performance criterion, called utility (or payoff) in the context of game theoretic studies.
We formally prove that the hierarchical structure of the game naturally leads to a spectrum orthogonalization pattern where the components of the network have incentive to transmit on different carriers. This orthogonalization feature across the multiple interfering devices is particularly appealing, not only from an interworking perspective (as a result of reduced infrastructure), but also for increasing both network coverage and data capacity without the need to split the available spectrum. In this sense, we prove that the advantage of the hierarchical (Stackelberg) model that we propose over the simultaneous-move model in [5] is rather significant.
One could wonder that, as soon as the number of carriers is high, interference can be avoided with high probability. We show next that users still experience interference even when the number of carriers to number of users ratio exceeds a few units, especially for synchronous decision makers. Moreover, to the best of our knowledge, performance bounds have never been derived in the multiple carrier context. This allows us to provide tight closed-form bounds on the spectral efficiency of such a model. We formally prove that the spectrum orthogonalization capability induced by the proposed hierarchical game model enables the wireless network to achieve the spectral efficiency improvement while still enjoying a high energy efficiency. In particular, we show that the orthogonalization feature makes correlation over carriers suitable for energy efficient systems as it brings more orthogonalization over the system (and thus leads to higher spectral efficiency), while correlation over users is not suited as it degrades the spectral efficiency.
RELATED LITERATURE AND NOVELTY OF THE WORK
To reduce the network energy consumption, [6] proposed an optimal traffic aware scheme using an online stochastic game theoretic algorithm. In [7] , authors proposed a joint transmitter and receiver optimization for the energy efficiency in orthogonal frequency-division multiple-access (OFDMA) systems. Energy efficient power control game has been first proposed by Goodman et al. in [8] for flat fading channels and re-used by [5] for multi-carrier systems. [9] proposed an energy efficient topology control game for wireless ad hoc networks in the presence of selfish nodes. All these works do not consider hierarchy among different actors in the system. However, as mentioned in [8] the Nash equilibrium in such games can be very energy inefficient. Note that the Stackelberg formulation arises naturally in many context of practical interest. For example, the hierarchy is inherent to cognitive radio networks (CRNs) where the user with the higher priority (i.e., the leader or the primary user (PU)) transmits first, then the user with the lower priority (i.e., the follower or the secondary user (SU)) transmits after sensing the spectral environment [10] - [12] . This is also a natural setting for heterogeneous wireless networks due to the absence of coordination among the small cells, and between small cells and macro cells [13] - [15] . There have been many works on Stackelberg games [16] - [18] , but they do not consider energy efficiency for the individual utility as defined in [8] . They rather consider transmission rate-type utilities (see e.g., [19] , [20] ).
In a prior work [21] , we proposed a hierarchical game theoretic model for two-user-two-carrier energy efficient wireless systems. It was shown that, for the vast majority of cases, users choose their transmitting carriers in such a way that if the leader transmits on a given carrier, the follower has incentive to choose the other carrier. One major motivation of this paper is to extend the original problem in [21] to some general models that can be widely used in practice by considering an arbitrary number of carriers.
The work that is most closely related to ours is [22] , where the hierarchical game was formulated for the energy efficiency maximization problem in the single carrier system. Notably, it has been proved that, when only one carrier is available for the players, there exists a unique Stackelberg equilibrium. However, multi-carrier systems have gained intense interest in wireless communications, making the use of multi-carrier transmissions much more appealing for future wireless systems, such as LTE. In fact, the multi-dimensional nature of such a problem along with the physical properties of the transmission phenomenon make the extension to an arbitrary number of carriers problem much more challenging than the single carrier model. We will see later in the paper that, contrary to [22] , we show that, when we come up to study multi-carrier hierarchical games, the degree of freedom increases and leading becomes better than following. This means that a player can often take advantage of playing first (as the leader), but not always. Indeed, if the players are in the same conditions, a player can improve his utility by playing after observing the action of the other player.
In the light of the above, the paper is structured as follows. The general system model is presented in Sec. II. Sec. III reviews the simultaneous-move game and presents the hierarchical game problem. Then, in Sec. IV, we characterize the Stackelberg equilibrium, and we evaluate the performance of the Stackelberg approach in Sec. V. Sec. VI provides numerical results to illustrate and validate the theoretical findings derived in the previous sections. Additional comments and conclusions are provided in Sec. VII.
II. ENERGY EFFICIENT WIRELESS NETWORK MODEL
We consider a wireless network, in which mobile users access to the spectrum in an asynchronous way. We assume that the overall bandwidth can be divided into an arbitrary number of narrow-band carriers (K ≥ 2), and that the carriers are narrow enough to undergo flat fading. Let us further suppose that the channels are quasi-static flat fading, i.e., the channel gains are constant during each frame but may change from one frame to the next.
Without the constraint of exclusive assignment of each carrier for users, we generally formulate the problem of energy efficiency maximization by allowing that a carrier could be shared by multiple users. One can think of heterogeneous networks (HetNets) or ultra-dense networks (UDNs) composed of different cellular layers and multiple access technologies. In order to improve the efficiency of spectrum use, multiple overlapping networks operate on the same frequency bands, causing (co-channel) interference, which, in turn, can cause harmful throughput degradation. To be specific, in the following, we will consider a decentralized multiple access channel composed of a leader -indexed by 1, having the priority to access the medium, and a follower -indexed by 2 that accesses the medium after observing the action of the leader. This setting is particularly relevant for CRNs with the PU as the leader and the SU as the follower, with the difference that no guarantee of service to the PU is considered while sharing the spectrum with the SU. It is also suited for sparse mobile networks in which one may neglect the possibility of simultaneous interference of more than two users. An extension of the proposed model to multiple users with multi-hierarchical levels can be found in [23] , where two nearly-optimal algorithms that ensure complete spectrum orthogonalization across users were proposed. Notice that closed-form solutions for the multi-user hierarchical game is in general very difficult to obtain. Accordingly, for any user n ∈ {1, 2} and m = n, the received signal-to-noise plus interference ratio (SINR) is expressed as
We will call h k n the effective channel gain, defined as the ratio between the SINR and the transmission power of the other users over the k th carrier. g k n and p k n are resp. the fading channel gain and the transmitted power of user n transmitting on carrier k, whereas σ 2 stands for the variance of the Gaussian noise. We statistically model the channel gains g k n to be independent identically distributed (i.i.d.) over the fading coefficients. It follows from the above SINR expression that the strategy chosen by a user affects the performance of other users in the network through multipleaccess interference.
The system model adopted throughout the paper is based on the seminal paper [8] that defines the energy efficiency framework. In order to formulate the power control problem as a game, we first need to define a utility function suitable for data applications. Let us first define the "efficiency" function f (·), which measures the packet success rate. In brief, when SINR is very low, data transmission results in massive errors and the goodput (rate conditioned to errors) tends to 0; when SINR is very high, data transmission becomes error-free and the rate grows asymptotically to a constant. However, achieving a high SINR level requires the user terminal to transmit at a high power, which in turn results in low battery life. This phenomenon is concisely captured by an increasing, continuous and S-shaped "efficiency" function f (·). A more detailed discussion of the efficiency function can be found in [24] - [26] . The following utility function allows one to measure the corresponding tradeoff between the transmission benefit (total goodput over the K carriers) and cost (total power over the K carriers):
where R n is the transmission data rate of user n and p n is the power allocation vector of user n over all carriers, i.e., p n = (p 1 n , . . . , p K n ). The quantity R n can be viewed as the gross (transmission) data rate on the radio interface which only depends on the user's application/service induced by high layers such as the transport and the application layers. This target rate may depend on the type of application, but not on the physical layer or the wireless environment of the user. The utility function u n , that has bits per Joule as units, perfectly captures the tradeoff between goodput and battery life, and is particularly suitable for applications where energy efficiency is crucial.
III. THE GAME THEORETIC FORMULATION
One proposal for designing spectrum sharing is through game theory which offers basis to model interactions between interacting users and develop decentralized and/or distributed algorithms for resource allocation.
The Nash equilibrium concept assumes that the players decide simultaneously. One important framework of non-cooperative games is to assume that one player can observe the decision of the other player before deciding. This concept can be related to asymmetric information/decision in non-cooperative games and is related to the concept of Stackelberg equilibrium.
B. The hierarchical game problem
Hierarchical models in wireless networks are motivated by the idea that the utility of the leader obtained at the Stackelberg equilibrium can often be improved over his utility obtained at the Nash equilibrium when the two users play simultaneously [17] . It has been proved, in [22] , that when only one carrier is available for the players, there exists a unique Stackelberg equilibrium in which both the leader and the follower improve their utilities. The goal is then to find a Stackelberg equilibrium in this bi-level game [27] .
In this work, we consider a Stackelberg game framework in which, a foresighted follower adapts his power allocation vector p 2 , based on the power vector of the leader p 1 chosen in advance. The power allocation of the shortsighted leader will re-embody in the form of interference introduced to the foresighted follower as given by Eq. (2) . At the core lies the idea that, the foresighted follower will extract the useful asymmetry information in order to make more efficient hierarchical decision making.
Definition 2. (Stackelberg equilibrium):
A vector of actions p = ( p 1 , p 2 ) = ( p 
where for all p 1 , we have
and p 2 = p 2 ( p 1 ). Remark 1. Note that, for sake of clarity, we will only consider the most interesting (and non-trivial) regime where the transmit powers are less than maximal power levels. However, all the results can be easily extended to the case of finite powers.
IV. CHARACTERIZATION OF THE STACKELBERG EQUILIBRIUM
We first determine the best-response function of the follower depending on the action of the leader. This approach is similar to backward induction technique. This result comes directly from Proposition 1 of [5] . For making this paper sufficiently self-contained, we review here the latter proposition.
Proposition 1 (Given in [5] ). Given the power allocation vector p 1 of the leader, the best-response of the follower is given by
with
and γ * is the unique (positive) solution of the first order equation
Note that Eq. (4) has a unique solution if the efficiency function f (·) is sigmoidal [28] . The last proposition says that the best-response of the follower is to use only one carrier, the one such that the effective channel gain is the best.
Let us first present a useful result that will allow us to reduce the complexity of the original problem (with K carriers) to a simpler one where we only focus on the two best carriers. 
For the clarity of the exposition, all the propositions are proven in the Appendix.
Given this result, we may only concentrate on strategies where each of the players uses one of his two best carriers. The proposition below gives the algorithm to compute the equilibrium power allocations for both players. Before the proposition, we introduce additional notation, namelŷ
. Proposition 3. If B 1 = B 2 then equilibrium power allocation of each of the players is
If B 1 = B 2 then the equilibrium power allocations of the players are computed in three steps:
equilibrium power allocation of the leader is
and that of the follower is
Otherwise, go to steps 2 and 3.
2) Find all the solutions x ≤γ 1+γ * (1+γ) to the equation
If there are solutions different than x = 0, choose the one for which
is the highest.
Let β * be this solution.
3)
Compare four values 2 :
.
If V B 1 is the greatest, then equilibrium power allocations of the leader and the follower are
is the greatest, then equilibrium power allocations of the leader and the follower are
If U S 1 is the greatest, then equilibrium power allocation of the leader is
is (the only) greatest, then the game has no equilibrium.
While the formulation of Prop. 3 is rather complicated, it can be explained in a simpler manner.
It describes essentially the way the choice is made by the leader (the follower adjusts to it according to Prop. 1). If the best carrier of the leader is different than that of the follower, he transmits on his best carrier with power corresponding to SINR γ * . If their best carriers are the same, the leader tries to optimize his power on his best carrier B 1 , by choosing between two powers corresponding to two values of SINR: β * , which gives the highest value of the leader's utility if the follower transmits on the same carrier as the leader, creating interference, orγ, which is the smallest value of SINR forcing the follower to change his carrier and reduce the interference on B 1 . If he can obtain a better utility than the best of the two on some other carrier S 1 , he chooses to transmit there with the power corresponding to γ * .
Remark 2. Note that the equilibria computed Prop. 3 are unique as long as channel gains for different carriers are different and as long as
Also the response of the follower at equilibrium is unique as long as channel gains for different carriers are different and W B 1 is not the greatest value in step 3) of the algorithm described by the theorem 3 . The matter of uniqueness of the follower's response is obviously very important, as in case there are multiple best responses to an equilibrium strategy of the leader, the follower has no incentive to follow his equilibrium policy. In our case the equilibrium strategy can be imposed to the follower when he has multiple best responses to the leader's policy by using a simple trick: whenever W B 1 appears to be the greatest in step 3), the leader has to use power infinitesimally smaller than that prescribed by his equilibrium policy. This gives him a minimally smaller utility, but at the same time makes the best response of the follower unique. Prop. 3 can be repeated under assumption that whenever the desired value of the SINR cannot be reached within the constrained regime, the users transmit at their maximum power. In that way
we also obtain an equilibrium in the model. However, considering power constraints will induce additional cases where the equilibrium is such that some users transmit with their maximum power P max , complicating the formulation of the results, without changing their general sense.
The next proposition characterizes the degenerate case when there is no equilibrium in the Stackelberg game.
Proposition 4. The Stackelberg game has no equilibrium iff
but for any ǫ > 0 there are ǫ-equilibria of the form
for the leader and 
One can check that f is concave on interval [0, 3 4 ] and convex on [ , so it is definitely a sigmoidal function. It is straightforward to compute that γ * = 1 for this function. Unfortunately, Equation (5) has no solutions on (0, ∞), which can be computed either numerically or using Taylor expansion of the function
, and so for g
2 and g
, the inequality (6) will be satisfied.
On the other hand, any of the two following assumptions:
implies that (6) is never satisfied, and so the game under consideration always has an equilibrium.
In particular, for the most standard form of f [5] ,
not only there always exists an equilibrium in the Stackelberg model (because f satisfies (A1)), but also the procedure in Proposition 3 slightly simplifies, as:
2) Eq. (5) can be written as M(x − x 2 γ * ) = e x − 1, moreover it has exactly one positive solution.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
This section is dedicated to present some key properties and performances of the Stackelberg equilibrium we derived in the previous section. We first study the individual performance of each player. Then, we evaluate the global performance of the system in terms of energy efficiency and spectral efficiency.
A. Individual Performance Evaluation 1) Spectrum orthogonalization:
In this section, we shall first look for what values of channel gains for each of the users there is a possibility that both the leader and the follower transmit on the same carrier. In the sequel, we will refer to the case where users transmit on the same carrier as there is no orthogonalization between users, i.e., ∃ k | p k n = 0 for n = {1, 2}. Then, we will compute the probability that there is no orthogonalization between the players. 
Note that G 0 is exactly the set of g k 1 s for which there is no orthogonalization in the simultaneousmove game considered in [5] . Thus, introducing hierarchy in the game induces more spectrum orthogonalization than there was in the simultaneous-move scenario.
In the next proposition, we will show that the probability of no orthogonalization between the players is always small and decreases fast as the number of carriers grows.
Proposition 6. Assume that the channel gains for different carriers of each of the users are i.i.d.
Rayleigh random variables. Then, the probability that there is no orthogonalization between the players at the Stackelberg equilibrium is bounded above by
where B denotes the Beta function, which is the exact probability of no orthogonalization in the simultaneous-move version of the model.
Remark 5. In the above proposition, we suppose that the channel gains of different players are not correlated, which is typically the case when carriers are far enough [29] . Otherwise, the probability computed there can be treated as an upper bound for respective probabilities, when there is a positive correlation between different carriers of each of the users, which is much more realistic. We will see later in the paper (see Fig. 1 and 2 ) that, in the case of positive correlation over carriers, these probabilities will be even smaller (and so faster decreasing to 0).
Remark 6. Now, the opposite situation to that analyzed in Prop. 6 is when both users experience the same channel gains. The probability that there is no orthogonalization between the players in the Stackelberg game is then bounded above by
which is still decreasing to 0 as K goes to infinity, but K times bigger than the bound in Eq.
(8). The intuition behind this is that, if the channels of different users are not correlated, then with probability (K − 1)/K users have different best channels and with only 1/K users have the same best channels (and interference is an issue in this case). If users experience the same channel gains, they have the same best channel with probability 1. Also, if the number of carriers K is big, both users will have two best carriers of similar quality as the channel gains are chosen at random, so the probability that they choose the same carrier becomes very small (see Fig. 3 and 4).
2) Payoffs comparison:
The leader is not worse off on introducing hierarchy (which is always the case in Stackelberg games if both the leader and the follower use their equilibrium policies), but the follower loses on it in some cases. 
3) Comparison between leading and following:
It is known from [22] , that if there is only one carrier available for the players, it is always better to be the follower than to be the leader. The situation changes when the number of carriers increases. 
2) B 1 = B 2 and min{
Although the formulation of the proposition is rather complicated, its general meaning is simple.
It states that, in most of the cases, different users have different best carriers, so there is no difference between leading and following. The two remaining cases are when both players have the same best carrier. In the first one, each of the players has only one good carrier and the same for both. This situation reduces to the problem considered in [22] where only one carrier is available, and so every user can obtain better energy efficient utility by decreasing its priority from leading to following. The reason behind this phenomenon is basically the construction of the energy-efficient utility. In the simultaneous-move version of this model each user transmits with the power corresponding to the SINR γ * . Under Stackelberg regime, the leader can increase his utility by reducing his power consumption to the level corresponding to the SINR β * < γ * , which reduces the overconsumption due to interference. The optimal answer of the follower will still be to use the power giving him the SINR of γ * though. The result of the shift in the power used by the leader without a similar change in that of the follower is that both utilities increase simultaneously, but the increase of the utility of the follower is bigger than that of the leader. In the second case, both players have the same best carrier but one of them prefers to use his second best carrier instead (that is -the second best carrier is not much worse than the best one). In this situation, it is the leader who is better off on introducing hierarchy, so this becomes similar to most of the Stackelberg models 4 . It is worth noting though that if g k n are i.i.d. Rayleigh random variables, one of the two first cases of Proposition 8 will occur with probability significantly bigger
, and so it will be very close to 1 even for small values of K. We will show later in the paper (see Figure 9 ) that, in practice, it is the last situation that prevails whenever the players have at least two carriers at their disposal. 4 Notice that in basic standard economic problems, it is commonly known that a firm does always better by preempting the market and setting its output level first (e.g., in Cournot-like competition games) [30] .
B. System Performance Evaluation 1) Energy efficiency:
Let us now compute the social welfare in our model, defined as the sum of utilities of both players. In the following proposition, we give upper bounds on the possible decrease of social welfare when we introduce hierarchy in the game, as well as a bound on the ratio of the maximum social welfare obtainable and that of Stackelberg equilibrium in the game.
The latter can be treated as the price of anarchy [31] in our game. 1) Is at most
times worse than that in simultaneous-move game equilibrium.
2) Is at most
times worse than the maximum social welfare obtainable in the game.
Note that, when g k n are i.i.d. Rayleigh variables (as assumed in Proposition 6), then a) the region where Stackelberg equilibrium is not the social optimum shrinks fast as the number of carriers increases; b) even in case there is no orthogonalization in Stackelberg equilibrium, the ratios appearing in the above proposition are small with probability increasing with the number of carriers.
2) Spectral efficiency: Along with energy efficiency, spectral efficiency -defined as the throughput per unit of bandwidth -is one of the key performance evaluation criteria for wireless network design. These two conflicting criteria can be linked through their tradeoff [32] , [33] . Therefore, it is often imperative to make a tradeoff between energy efficiency and spectral efficiency. In the following, we give a closed-form expression of the lower bound on the sum spectral efficiency of the proposed Stackelberg model.
Proposition 10. The spectral efficiency in case there is a orthogonalization between the users at the Stackelberg equilibrium is strictly bigger than
which is equal to the spectral efficiency in the simultaneous-move game.
The computation done in Proposition 10 holds in case there is orthogonalization between the players. This means that this is only a lower bound for the total spectral efficiency in our model.
However, by Proposition 6, it becomes very tight as K goes to infinity. An easy consequence of this is that the spectral efficiency in the limit model (with an infinite number of carriers) can be computed exactly, and is equal to log 2 (1 + γ * ). Notice that, when users experience the same Fig. 1 . The probability of no orthogonalization between the players at the Nash equilibrium with correlation over carriers. Rayleigh channel gains, the spectral efficiency in case there is a orthogonalization between the users at the Stackelberg equilibrium is strictly bigger than
VI. SIMULATION RESULTS
We consider the energy efficiency function, f (x) = (1 − e −x ) M , well-known in power allocation games, where M = 100 is the block length in bits. For this efficiency function, γ * ≃ 6.4 (or 8.1 dB). Simulations were carried out using a rate R n = 1 bps for n = {1, 2}. We have simulated 10000 scenarios to remove the random effects from Rayleigh fading.
A. The probability of no orthogonalization
Let us first consider a quasi-static correlated Rayleigh-fading channel model. Fig. 1 and 2 reflect the effect of the correlation over carriers (i.e., the correlation between different carriers of each of the users) on the probability of no orthogonalization for the simultaneous (Nash) and the hierarchical (Stackelberg) game respectively. The correlation model follows the model in [34] . As we expected in Section V-A1 (see Remark 4) , results show that, in the case of correlated carriers, Fig. 3 . The probability of no orthogonalization between the players at the Nash equilibrium with correlation over users. Fig. 4 . The probability of no orthogonalization between the players at the Stackelberg equilibrium with correlation over users. the probability of no orthogonalization is smaller and so faster decreasing to 0 even for a moderate number of carriers K.
From now on, we will only consider the case of no correlation between different carriers of each of the users. In case of correlated carriers, performance results obtained in the remainder have to be considered as a worst case performance. Fig. 3 and 4 investigate the effect of the correlation over users (i.e., the correlation between different users' fading channel) on the probability of no orthogonalization for the Nash and the Stackelberg game respectively. The correlation factor modeling the dependencies between the users is θ. In both figures, results show that, as the correlation between different users decreases, the probability of no orthogonalization gets even smaller and so faster decreasing to 0, which corresponds to what Remark 5 claims. In order to assess the accuracy of the theoretical bounds, we also compare the simulated probability of no orthogonalization with the theoretical upperbounds. More specifically, for i.i.d. users, we compare theoretical curve derived in Eq. (8) with simulated curve for θ = 0. For correlated users, we compare theoretical curve in Eq. (9) with simulated curve for θ = 1. We see that the simulated and theoretical curves match pretty well. Now, when we look at the Stackelberg equilibrium in Fig. 4 , it is clearly illustrated that the theoretical upper-bounds derived in Eq. (8) and Eq. (9) turn out to be greater than the simulated probabilities of no orthogonalization, which confirms the accuracy of the results. Remember that the theoretical curves derived in Eq. (8) and Eq. (9) correspond to the exact probability of no orthogonalization in the simultaneous-move game, but are only upper-bounds in the hierarchical version of the model, which is clearly confirmed by Fig. 3 and 4 . Fig. 5 and 6 depict the probability of no orthogonalization for different schemes considering independent users (i.e., for θ = 0) and correlated users (i.e., for θ = 1) respectively. Both curves follow the same trend, tending to increase the orthogonalization between the users as the number of carriers grows, which validates the obtained theoretical results. A rather significant gap between Nash and Stackelberg curves suggests that introducing hierarchy results in much more orthogonalization between the players. Particularly noteworthy is the fact that, at the social optimum, we always obtain strict orthogonalization between users. This means that, in a centralized system, if maximizing the energy efficiency is the goal, introducing hierarchy moves the solution closer to the social optimum.
To sum it up, we can argue that correlation across carriers is a suitable feature as it brings more orthogonalization (and thus leads to a better spectral efficiency), desirable from the social point of view, while correlation across users is not suited as it increases the probability of no orthogonalization. This results is of practical interest as it suggests that designing the power control for multi-carrier networks shall be developed tailored to the physical properties of the transmission phenomenon.
B. Energy efficiency
We then resort to plot the average energy efficiency at the equilibrium for increasing number of carriers K. The curves obtained in Fig. 7 for independent users (i.e., for θ = 0) exhibit a different trend than ones in Fig. 8 for correlated users (i.e., for θ = 1). Indeed, we remark that the Stackelberg perform almost the same as the Nash game for θ = 0, whereas, for θ = 1, the gap between the Nash game and the Stackelberg game increases. More specifically, the Stackelberg model achieves an energy efficiency gain up to 25% with respect to the Nash model for K = 4 carriers. As the number of carriers K goes large, both configurations tend towards having the same average energy efficiency. This can be justified by the fact that, when the number of carriers increases, the probability that users transmit on different carriers is high (see Section V-A1) and thus, users are less sensitive to their degree of hierarchy in the system (see Prop. 9). Interestingly, in both the independent and correlated users' cases, the Stackelberg game achieves almost the same energy efficiency as at the social welfare, which tends to validate results in Prop. 9. Fig. 9 illustrates the per-user energy efficiency with independent users. Interestingly, we see from Fig . 9 . Per-user energy efficiency with independent users. User 1 and user 2 in the Stackelberg game refer to the leader and the follower respectively. Fig. 9 that, at the Stackelberg equilibrium, the energy efficiency of the follower in the Stackelberg game is smaller than in the simultaneous-move game. This suggests that, for the vast majority of cases, Situation 3) in Prop. 7 is more likely to occur for a low number of carriers K. As K increases, Situation 1) in Prop. 7 is more likely to occur yielding the same energy efficiency for both the leader and the follower in the Stackelberg game as in the simultaneous-move game. This is justified by the fact that, with probability 1/K, resp. (K − 1)/K, users have the same, resp. different, best channels. It is then easy to see that, for low K, users are more likely to have the same best channels and interference is an issue in this case yielding to Situation 3) in Prop. 7, whereas, for sufficiently large K, users are more likely to have different best channels yielding to Situation 1) in Prop. 7. Moreover, Fig. 9 also shows that it is profitable to be the leader which corresponds to what Prop. 8 points out.
C. Spectral efficiency
In Fig. 10 and 11 , we compare the closed-form expressions of the spectral efficiency derived in Eq. (10) for i.i.d. users (i.e., for θ = 0) and in Eq. (11) for correlated users (i.e., for θ = 1) with the simulated spectral efficiency. Of particular interest is the fact that the closed-form expressions turn out to be very tight. We can also observe that the Stackelberg game performs better than the Nash game in terms of average spectral efficiency particularly for correlated users while still performing very close to the social welfare. As an example, for K = 2 carriers, the Stackelberg game yields only a negligible spectral efficiency loss 0.05 bps/Hz with respect to the social welfare and approximately 0.22 bps/Hz of spectral efficiency gain beyond the Nash game.
D. Spectral efficiency -Energy efficiency Tradeoff
In order to illustrate the balance between the achievable rate and energy consumption of the system, we plot in Fig. 12 and 13 the spectral efficiency as a function of the energy efficiency for independent and correlated users respectively. Surprisingly, it is clearly shown that, for both the independent and correlated cases, the proposed Stackelberg decision approach achieves a flexible and desirable tradeoff between energy efficiency and throughput maximization compared to the social welfare and the Nash model. In particular, it is shown that the Stackelberg scheme maximizes the energy efficiency while still optimizing the spectral efficiency at the Stackelberg equilibrium.
Notice that this contrasts with most related works so far in which the optimal energy efficiency performance often leads to low spectral efficiency performance and vice versa [35] - [38] . This feature has a great impact on the network performance and provides a convincing argument that hierarchical communication is the proper context to design and optimize energy efficient wireless networks.
VII. CONCLUSION
The growing interest in energy efficient research from signal processing and communication communities has spurred an increasing interest in the recent years. There have been a large number of proposals for all communication layers, but the system infrastructure has not been clearly defined. In this paper, we have proposed a hierarchical game to model distributed joint power and channel allocation for multi-carrier energy efficient systems since it has the advantage of leading towards more realistic or even simpler distributed power control algorithms. We have established the existence of the Stackelberg equilibrium and gave its formal expression. The proposed scheme achieves better performances as compared to those of other existing schemes, notably the Nash model proposed in [5] . In particular, we have proved that introducing hierarchy across users induces a spectrum orthogonalization which substantially improves system performances. For the first time, we have derived the spectral efficiency of such a model with exact expressions for the throughput scaling. The proposed scheme can achieve a spectral efficiency scaling of 
The equality is only possible if each ratio
a k b k is equal.
Proof:
We proceed by induction with respect to n. For n = 2, let us assume that the hypothesis is not true and thus:
This can be rewritten as
or equivalently a 2 b 1 > a 1 b 2 > a 2 b 1 , which is a contradiction.
Next, assume that our hypothesis is true for any l < K. Then, we can proceed as follows:
If there is at least one pair (a k , b k ), whose ratio is bigger than the other ones we can show along the same lines that the inequality is strong (we only need to take these a k and b k from the sums Proof: Note that by Lemma 1
so the leader in the Stackelberg game cannot use more than one carrier simultaneously, as decreasing power to zero on every carrier different from the one realizing maximum above would be beneficial. Thus he will choose only one carrier for whicĥ
) (where p k 2 is computed according to (3) ) is the greatest. Note however that since the follower will chose only one carrier,f
only for one carrier, say carrier k * , and for any other carrier it will be equal to
, which is maximized for p
But this last value depends on the carrier only through g k 1 , so will be maximized for k = B 1 if only k * = B 1 . Thus the equilibrium strategy of the leader will put all the power on carrier B 1 in that case. If k * = B 1 , then the biggest value off
for k = k * will be for k = S 1 , and either all the power of the leader will be put on this carrier or on k * = B 1 .
As for the follower, by Proposition 1 his best response is always to put all his power on the carrier maximizingĥ
, which will be equal to g k 2 σ 2 for all but one carrier. Now the reasoning made for the leader can be applied here as well.
B. Proof of Proposition 3
Proof: First consider the case when B 1 = B 2 . The biggest possible value of the ratio f (γ k n ) p k n obtainable for player n on a single carrier (when his opponent does not maximize his payoff, but also the payoff of player n) is
Just this is obtained by both players when they apply strategies p n defined in the theorem. Thus none of them will be interested in changing his strategy. Now we move to the case when B 1 = B 2 . Suppose the leader uses only carrier B 1 in his equilibrium strategy. Then, by Proposition 2 the follower uses one of carriers B 1 = B 2 or S 2 . If he uses B 1 then by Proposition 1 the following has to be true:
Rewriting this we obtain that the follower chooses B 1 when
(12) and S 2 otherwise. Having this in mind, we can compute the utility of the leader at the equilibrium using carrier B 1 , namely
and
otherwise. Next we need to find the values of p B 1 1 maximizing (13) and (14) respectively. Before we obtain the first one we rewrite the SINR in that case in the following way:
and differentiate it with respect to p B 1 1 , obtaining: ∂γ
Next, we can transform (15) into
and put it into (16), obtaining:
Now we write the first order condition for the maximization of (13):
If we substitute (18) into it, we obtain the following equation:
If we find the best solution to this equation (that is, maximizing
), β * , we get the power allocation of the leader in case (12) , which can be computed from (17) as
Similarly, when we write the first order condition for the maximization of (14), we obtain .
Now, we put (20) and (21) in (13) and (14) respectively, obtaining the value functions corresponding to p * and p * * :
and U B 1 = f (γ * )g
Note that the first one is always smaller than the second one (because γ * maximizes the ratio f (x) x and γ * , β * > 0). So, in case p * satisfies the condition opposite to (12) , the leader will choose to transmit on B 1 with this power, while the follower will choose (according to (1) ) to transmit on S 2 with power γ * σ 2 g S 2 2
Next, when p * satisfies (12), the situation becomes more complex. The leader has to choose between one of the three possibilities: to choose the power p * * on carrier B 1 , giving him the value of V B 1 , to choose powerp =γ , which would give him the value U S 1 = f (γ * )g
Choosing the biggest one from V B 1 , W B 1 and U S 1 will give the leader's equilibrium payoff (and corresponding equilibrium strategy) in the Stackelberg game, unless V B 1 is not the biggest value obtainable by the leader in case (12) . This is only possible when the biggest value of (13) is obtained on one of the ends of the interval (0,γ 1+γ * (1+γ) ]. Thus, we compute these two values:
)g it is optimal for the leader to use the smallest power possible on carrier B 1 (which is not an equilibrium strategy, as for any arbitrarily small power there exists a smaller power, for which the value function of the leader is closer to V 0 B 1
. The power allocations of the follower in each of the cases of (12) are computed according to Proposition 1.
C. Proof of Proposition 4
Proof: The inequality (6) 
D. Proof of Proposition 5
Proof: By Proposition 3, no orthogonalization between the players is only possible if B 1 = B 2 , γ > γ * (22) and
(22) can be rewritten as
where P denotes the probability that for one of the players g To prove part 2) first note that the maximum utility that can be obtained in this game is bounded above by f (γ * )g
as this is the sum of maximal utilities of both players (but not obtainable at the same time if times less than (28) .
I. Proof of Proposition 10
Proof: No orthogonalization in the simultaneous-move game is possible exactly when B 1 = B 2 and g Bn n ≥ (1 + γ * )g Sn n for n = 1, 2. 1 minus the exact probability of that region is computed in Proposition 6, and this is also the lower bound on the same probability for the Stackelberg game.
The spectral efficiency in case there is orthogonalization between the players can be computed as the expected value of log 2 (1 + γ) over this region. Note however that γ ≡ γ * there, and so the bound on spectral efficiency is exactly log 2 (1 + γ * ) times (the bound on) the probability of orthogonalization, which is 1 − (1 + γ * )B(1 + γ * , K)
